Although the weekend culminating to this essay’s creation was a bit stressful, the essay itself still kicked butt, so I wanted to share it with you all. 
Freedom From Religion
By Kelsey White
The “separation of church and state” has repeatedly been quoted as a constitutional right from the First Amendment. However, this quote is actually taken from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802 (Jefferson 1). Major advocates for religious restraint interpret this to mean that the government can have no link whatsoever with religion, be it in the classroom, a public monument, or any other service remotely connected with the state. Nonetheless, when one reads this oft-quoted letter in its entirety, it becomes clear that this was not Jefferson’s view. He states: “Religion is a matter which lies solely between Man and his God…the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions…The legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church and State” (Jefferson 2). This quote certainly has no ties with the secular fire and brimstone one encounters with many anti-religion advocates. Jefferson posits merely that the government may not influence a man’s beliefs, for example, by requiring by law that every U. S. citizen practice and believe the teachings of Buddhism. Since the legislature should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” it’s difficult to understand how the Supreme Court can rationalize outlawing any public monument that is “plainly religious in nature” (Stone v. Graham 1). The case of Orden v. Perry confronts this argument in debating the constitutionality of a public statue displaying the Ten Commandments. Justice Rehnquist examines America’s religious history as well as the Constitution itself for his argument, while Justice Souter merely posits humanistic opinions.
Justice Rehnquist argued that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does allow the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds. He presented the fact that the monument was donated by the Eagles, a “national, social, civic, and patriotic association” (Rehnquist 3), which also paid the cost of erecting the monument. Thomas Van Orden, once a licensed lawyer, encountered the statue during his countless walks to and from the law library in the Supreme Court building for six years and finally decided to sue the state and petition for the monument’s removal because he felt it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court held that the statue “had a valid secular purpose in recognizing and commending the Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency” and thus did not violate the Establishment Clause (Rehnquist 5). The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Courts’ decision. It was only when this case was dragged into the Supreme Court that there was any real question of its constitutionality.
Rehnquist stated that this case “points in two directions, Janus-like” (Rehnquist 6), referencing the Roman god of doorways known for having two faces (Wikipedia). The first “face” looks back on America’s history, where Christian religion was not only “closely identified with our government” (Dist. Of Abington v. Schempp 212-213) but was in fact the “basis of freedom…the glue that held liberty and society, as a whole, together” (Whitehead 95). Whitehead also points out, “All the states of the United States of America have expressed either in their preambles or the body of the state constitution itself dependence on God for their preservation and strength” (Whitehead 96). The first words of the Mayflower Compact are “in the name of God, Amen.” The document posits that they are planting the first colony “by the Grace of God,” “for the Glory of God,” for the “Advancement of the Christian Faith,” and “in the Presence of God for our better Ordering and Preservation”. Likewise, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut states that its people “enter into Combination and Confederation together, to maintain and pursue the liberty and purity of the gospel of our Lord Jesus which we now profess, and also the discipline of the Churches, which, according to the truth of the said gospel, is now practiced among us” (para. 1). Even the Declaration of Independence states, “All men are endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights…governments are instituted to ensure those rights” (para. 2). Clearly, religion cannot be separated from state since the state was founded for the glory of God and the advancement of the Christian faith. Granted, that was not the only purpose, but it still stands that labeling America a “secular state” is not only false; it’s a classic example of historical revisionism.
The second “face” to which Rehnquist refers to looks at governmental intervention in religious matters as a danger to religious freedom and that “reconciling these two faces requires that we neither abdicate our responsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince a hostility to religion by disabling the government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage” (Rehnquist 6). Indeed, banning a statue representing the Ten Commandments because of its “plainly religious nature” would be like forming a museum respecting Holocaust survivors but omitting any Jewish symbols (Stone v. Graham. 1). Rehnquist goes on to say that acknowledgements of the role played by the Ten Commandments in America’s heritage are common (Rehnquist 12). To prove his point, he points out seven other monuments prominently featuring the Ten Commandments in the courtroom itself.
In short, Rehnquist conceives that “the inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance, partaking of both religion and government” and is therefore Constitutional (Rehnquist 13).
The dissenting party, Justice Souter, argues, “Although the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses have not been read to mandate absolute governmental neutrality towards religion, the Establishment Clause requires neutrality as a general rule” (Souter 2). He further argues, “A governmental display of an obviously religious text cannot be squared with neutrality except in a setting that plausibly indicates that the statement is not placed in view with a predominant purpose on the part of government either to adopt the religious message or to urge its acceptance by others” (Souter 2). Contrariwise, in Zorach v. Clauson, the justice found that “when a state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities…it then respects the religious nature of our people…to hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups” (Zorach v. Clauson 313-314). This “callous indifference” seems to be the very quality Souter advocates, but this Justice seems to have mistaken government neutrality for government antagonism.
Furthermore, in the above examples, almost all of the United States’ founding documents are “obviously religious text.” One could presume that a government with such a foundation is in itself “obviously religious.”
Souter further argues that “the statement of the Commandments, quoting God himself, proclaims that the will of the divine being is the source of obligation to obey the rules, including the facially secular ones,” and since “nothing in the context of the display detracts from the creche’s religious message…the government of Texas is telling everyone who sees the monument to live up to a moral code because God requires it” (Souter 3-4). Souter implies that the Ten Commandments are overtly religious because they advocate morality. In reality, any law related to morality has an innately religious nature. In fact, “law in the true sense is bibliocentric, concerned with justice in terms of the Creator’s revelation” (Whitehead 87). Alexis de Tocqueville observed, “In France I had seen the spirits of religion and of freedom almost always marching in opposite directions. In American I found them intimately linked together in joint reign over the same land” (Tocqueville 295).
The evidence is unquestionable. American law is, at its core, religious, so by Souter’s own standards, both the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence are “obviously religious text” (para. 2). Next he’ll declare the Constitution unconstitutional!
Furthermore, Souter falsely contends that a government statue displaying the Ten Commandments is the equivalent of Texas telling everyone who sees it to convert. By the same merit, the state couldn’t justify a public display of Da Vinci’s David, or else risk creating a generation of antiestablishment streakers.
Souter concedes that a display of the Commandments accompanied by an exposition of how they have influenced modern law would be most likely to be constitutionally unobjectionable (Souter 6). Would the passerbies really be unable to make the connection themselves? After all, the religious mandates such as “You shall not murder” and “You shall not steal” do bear some similarity with our constitutional laws. Even the more “spiritual” commandments such as “You shall have no other Gods before me” have secular merit. The Constitution specifically set up the government with checks and balances, to thwart any rulers with absolute power, i.e. tyrants, from taking control. Therefore, the Constitution essentially protected itself against a “false god,” or a man who completely ignores any higher law (Whitehead 78).
Essentially, Rehnquist and Souter come to the same argument with different worldviews. Rehnquist posits that this Ten Commandments statue honors America’s innately religious history. Souter argues that it forces the Christian doctrine upon any unfortunate passerby. Souter’s argument is not only a direct contradiction of the First Amendment; it also makes the faulty assumption that people cannot think for themselves. A man whose philosophical identity is so flimsy that seeing a statue of the Ten Commandments immediately compels him to adopt the Christian doctrine is pathetic indeed; by the same token, one would wonder how he would deal with suggestive salesmen or even a brief television commercial. Perhaps the Supreme Court should take a page out of a very old book and allow men to “choose for yourselves this day whom you will serve, whether the gods your forefathers served beyond the River, or the gods of the Amorites, in whose land you are living. But as for me and my household, we will serve the Lord” (Josh. 24:15).
Works Cited
Janus (Mythology)”, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, April 6, 2008,
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janus_(mythology)>
Whitehead, John W. The Second American Revolution. Charlottesville: Ruthorford Institute,
1982.
de Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Trans. George Lawrence. Garden City:
Doubleday, 1975.
Jefferson, Thomas. “Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists.” 1802.
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952).
District of Abington Township v. Schemmpp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Souter, J. Dissenting Opinion: Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677 (2005)
Rehnquist, C.J. Opinion: Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677 (2005)
The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1952.